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A. Searches by Public Employees other than Police
In the landmark case of New Jersey v. T.L.O.,1 the United
States Supreme Court applied the fourth amendment to searches
conducted by public school officials. This past term, in O'Conner v.
Ortega,2 the Court held that the fourth amendment is also applica-
ble to work-related searches conducted by public employers. As in
New Jersey v. T.L.O.,3 the Court rejected the probable cause stan-
dard in favor of a "reasonableness under all the circumstances"
test to determine the constitutionality of such searches. 4 This gen-
eral "reasonableness" approach was also approved in Maryland v.
Garrison,5 where the Court held that an "objectively understanda-
ble and reasonable" mistake as to the sub-unit (apartment) de-
scribed in the warrant does not render the search illegal.'
The United States Supreme Court refused to apply the lower
standard of reasonable suspicion in Arizona v. Hicks.7 The Court
held that the "traditional standard of probable cause" was re-
quired for seizures under the plain view doctrine.8
In Gray v. Commonwealth,9 the Virginia Supreme Court ex-
plained that the requirement for inadvertent plain view is not vio-
* This article summarizes significant legislative changes, decisions of the United States
and Virginia Supreme Courts, and decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals. A more
extensive consideration of this material as well as recent decisions of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit and federal district courts is contained in R. BACIGAL, VIRGINIA
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Supp. 1987).
** Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.S., 1964,
Concord College; LL.B., 1967, Washington & Lee University.
1. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
2. 107 S. Ct. 1492 (1987).
3. 469 U.S. 325.
4. 107 S. Ct. at 1497.
5. 107 S. Ct. 1013 (1987).
6. Id. at 1019.
7. 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987).
8. Id. at 1153.
9. 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
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lated merely because the defendant was a possible suspect in a
murder case and the police anticipated that during a drug search
they might find evidence relating to the murder.10 That line of rea-
soning was followed by the Virginia Court of Appeals in Stokes v.
Commonwealth," which held that "a generalized expectation that
seizable evidence may be found is not sufficient to preclude appli-
cation of the plain view doctrine."12
B. Consent Searches
The Virginia Court of Appeals offered some helpful guidance on
consent searches in the case of Walls v. Commonwealth.13 Observ-
ing that the police are not required to advise a suspect of his rights
before requesting permission to conduct a search, the court none-
theless held that the failure to warn the defendant of his rights
was one factor to be considered in determining whether the con-
sent was voluntary.14 The court held further that the defendant's
failure to order the police to leave did not constitute implied con-
sent.'5 The Walls court also noted that while consent obviates the
need for a warrant, the consent itself may be the fruit of an illegal
arrest. Finally, the court recognized that the validity of a third
party's consent to a search is not dependent upon the absence of
the defendant.'"
C. Open Fields or Curtilage
Continuing a string of recent decisions distinguishing open fields
from curtilage, the United States Supreme Court held in United
States v. Dunn 7 that curtilage questions should be resolved by
considering four factors: (1) the proximity of the area to the home;
(2) whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding
the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and (4)
the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from
observation. 8
10. Id. at 326, 356 S.E.2d at 164.
11. 4 Va. App. 207, 355 S.E.2d 611 (1987).
12. Id. at 211, 355 S.E.2d at 613.
13. 2 Va. App. 639, 347 S.E.2d 175 (1986).
14. Id. at 645, 347 S.E.2d at 178.
15. Id. at 646, 347 S.E.2d at 179.
16. Id. at 651, 347 S.E.2d at 182.
17. 107 S. Ct. 1134 (1987).
18. Id. at 1139.
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The Virginia Court of Appeals held in Kearney v. Common-
wealth10 that a warrant authorizing a search of the dwelling and
curtilage justified a search of a "broken down," "inoperable" truck
found in the backyard of the dwelling.20 The court of appeals also
held in Allen v. Commonwealth21 that the police acted reasonably
in searching the owner who was about to drive away from his house
when the police arrived to execute a search warrant.22
D. Automobile Searches
In Colorado v. Bertine,23 the United States Supreme Court held
that the police may exercise discretion when taking inventory of
the contents of an automobile, "so long as that discretion is exer-
cised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something
other than suspicion of criminal activity."'24 The case of Kearney v.
Commonwealth25 also involved a search of an automobile. In that
case, the Virginia Court of Appeals held that "a search may be as
extensive as reasonably required to locate the items described in
the warrant"; thus, the search is not limited by the possibility that
separate acts of entry or opening of containers may be necessary to
complete the search.26
E. Searches of Dwellings
In Verez v. Commonwealth,27 the Virginia Supreme Court recog-
nized ten forms of exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless
entry of a dwelling.28 Verez was distinguished this past term in
Walls v. Commonwealth.29 In Walls, the court of appeals con-
cluded that there was no justification for a warrantless entry be-
cause there was "nothing inherently dangerous" in the situation.30
The court acknowledged, however, that a protective sweep of a
19. 4 Va. App. 202, 355 S.E.2d 897 (1987).
20. Id. at 205, 355 S.E.2d at 899.
21. 3 Va. App. 657, 353 S.E.2d 162 (1987).
22. Id. at 662, 353 S.E.2d at 165.
23. 107 S. Ct. 738 (1987).
24. Id. at 743.
25. 4 Va. App. 202, 355 S.E.2d 897 (1987).
26. Id. at 205, 355 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting United States v. Wuagneux, 683 F.2d 1343, 1352
(11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814 (1983)).
27. 230 Va. 405, 337 S.E.2d 749 (1985).
28. Id. at 410-11, 335 S.E.2d at 753.
29. 2 Va. App. 639, 347 S.E.2d 175 (1986).
30. Id. at 648, 347 S.E.2d at 180.
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building is permissable when the police can point to specific and
articulable facts supporting their belief that other dangerous per-
sons may be in the building or elsewhere on the premises.31
F. Statutory Procedures for Arrests
Addressing some of the statutory procedures for arrests, the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court held in Frye v. Commonwealth32 that the
failure to take a suspect before a magistrate without unnecessary
delay may violate statutory requirements, but it does not render
the arrest unconstitutional. 3 In a similar vein, the court of appeals
in Woreford v. Commonwealth, 4 recognized that failure to comply
with the statutory provisions governing the arrest of someone driv-
ing under the influence of alcohol does not render the arrest
illegal. 5
G. Wiretapping
In Smith v. Commonwealth,36 the Virginia Court of Appeals of-
fered its first interpretation of the Virginia Wiretap Statute.3 7 The
court held that the void-for-vagueness doctrine is not applicable to
those sections of the statute that are not penal in nature. The
court interpreted section 19.2-66,8 which identifies which court
has jurisdiction to authorize a wiretap. The court stated that juris-
diction depends upon the locale where the physical intercept oc-
curs. The court defined the term intercept as "the physical act
(such as splicing) by which the interceptor gains the ability to ex-
ercise dominion and control over the communication.""
H. Exclusionary Rule
The exclusionary rule was addressed by both the Virginia Court
of Appeals and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In
Williams v. Commonwealth,40 the Virginia Court of Appeals dis-
31. Id. at 649, 347 S.E.2d at 181.
32. 231 Va. 370, 345 S.E.2d 267 (1986).
33. Id. at 376, 345 S.E.2d at 273.
34. 3 Va. App. 467, 351 S.E.2d 47 (1986).
35. Id. at 472, 351 S.E.2d at 49.
36. 3 Va. App. 650, 353 S.E.2d 159 (1987).
37. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-61 to -70 (Repl. Vol. 1983 & Cum. Supp. 1987).
38. Id. § 19.2-66.
39. Smith, 3 Va. App. at 654, 353 S.E.2d at 161.
40. 4 Va. App. 53, 354 S.E.2d 79 (1987).
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cussed the principle of standing to exclude evidence. The court
held that "by disclaiming ownership of [a] briefcase, [the defend-
ant] abandoned it for fourth amendment purposes."'"
In Walls v. Commonwealth,42 the court of appeals set forth the
requirements of the inevitable discovery doctrine. The court stated
that the prosecution must establish: (1) a reasonable probability
that the evidence in question would have been discovered by law-
ful means but for the police misconduct; (2) that the police possess
the leads which made the discovery inevitable at the time of the
misconduct; and (3) that the police, prior to the misconduct, were
actively pursuing the alternative line of investigation.43
The Fourth Circuit recognized in United States v. Whitehorn
44
that evidence first observed during an illegal search, but subse-
quently seized during a second search pursuant to a valid warrant,
is admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine.
In Walls v. Commonwealth,46 the Virginia Court of Appeals re-
fused to extend the good faith exception to warrantless searches.
The United States Supreme Court held, however, in Illinois v.
Krul14 7 that the exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence seized
as a result of warrantless searches by police in situations where the
police reasonably relied upon a statute that is later held to violate
the fourth amendment.48
II. BAIL
In the well publicized decision of United States v. Salerno,49 the
United States Supreme Court upheld provisions of the 1984 Bail
Reform Act which authorize pretrial detention of arrestees who are
charged with certain felonies and who are found, after an adver-
sary hearing, to pose a threat to the safety of individuals or to the
community.
The 1987 General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to pro-
41. Id. at 70, 354 S.E.2d at 88-89.
42. 2 Va. App. 639, 347 S.E.2d 175 (1986).
43. Id. at 656, 347 S.E.2d at 185.
44. 813 F.2d 646 (4th Cir. 1987).
45. Id. at 650.
46. 2 Va. App. at 657, 347 S.E.2d at 185-86.
47. 107 S. Ct. 1160 (1987).
48. Id. at 1167.
49. 107 S. Ct. 2095 (1987).
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vide that bail is not to be used to satisfy fines and costs imposed
where the conditions of the bail were met, unless the person who
posted the bail consents.5 0 However, if the defendant fails to ap-
pear and is tried in absentia, the defendant's bond is first applied
to fines and costs and the remainder is then forfeited.51 The Code
was also amended to require the trial court to specify in the record
the reason for its denial of bail, and to authorize the appellate
court to set bail where it overrules the decision of the trial court.2
III. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
A. Confessions
In Colorado v. Connelly,53 a case that may have far ranging im-
plications, the United States Supreme Court held that a confession
cannot be deemed involuntary under the due process clause unless
the confession is linked to coercion by government agents.54 The
Court suggested, however, that a confession rendered unreliable by
factors beyond the control of the government might still be ex-
cluded under the local jurisdiction's rules of evidence.5
In Richardson v. Marsh,"6 the Supreme Court approved the ad-
mission of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession at a joint trial
with the defendant. The Court required, however, that the confes-
sion be redacted to eliminate all references to the defendant, and
that the jury be instructed not to consider the confession when de-
termining the defendant's guilt or innocence.57
B. Miranda Warnings
In May v. Commonwealth,58 the Virginia Court of Appeals fol-
lowed Berkemer v. McCarty5" in holding that traffic stops do not
normally trigger Miranda requirements unless the stop exerts
pressures upon a detained person that impair his privilege against
self-incrimination.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-120 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
51. Id. § 19.2-143.
52. Id. § 19.2-319.
53. 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986).
54. Id. at 521.
55. Id. at 522.
56. 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).
57. Id. at 1708-09; see also Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987).
58. 3 Va. App. 348, 349 S.E.2d 428 (1986).
59. 468 U.S. 420 (1984).
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In Wright v. Commonwealth, ° the court of appeals held that
"[t]he term 'interrogation' under Miranda does not include words
or actions by the police which are normally attendant to arrest and
custody."6 1 The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated in
United States v. Taylor6 2 that "[o]rdinarily, the request for identi-
fying information, however phrased, is inherently ministerial and
does not violate Miranda.6 3
In Colorado v. Spring,4 the United States Supreme Court held
that Miranda does not require that the suspect be informed of the
nature of the crimes about which he will be questioned. The Court
stated that failure to inform the suspect of all the possible subjects
of interrogation does not constitute official trickery sufficient to in-
validate the suspect's waiver of his Miranda rights.6
In Connecticut v. Barrett,66 the Supreme Court ruled that a sus-
pect's voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights is not negated by* the
suspect's refusal to sign a written statement. The suspect in that
case agreed to make a oral statement but refused to sign a written
statement without advice from his counsel.
Finally, in Arizona v. Mauro,7 the Supreme Court held that
there was no interrogation within the meaning of Miranda when
the suspect spoke with his wife knowing that a police officer was
taping the conversation.
IV. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL
In criminal cases, an indigent has a statutory right to court-ap-
pointed counsel before the Virginia Court of Appeals and the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court.18 In Gray v. Commonwealth, 6 however, the
Virginia Supreme Court rejected the defendant's contention that
the right to counsel included the right to spend public funds to
secure statistical reports regarding the imposition of the death
penalty on blacks accused of murdering whites. Gray held also that
60. 2 Va. App. 743, 348 S.E.2d 9 (1986).
61. Id. at 746, 348 S.E.2d at 12.
62. 799 F.2d 126 (4th Cir. 1986).
63. Id. at 128.
64. 107 S. Ct. 851 (1987).
65. Id. at 858.
66. 107 S. Ct. 828 (1987).
67. 107 S. Ct. 1931 (1987).
68. Dodson v. Department of Corrections, 233 Va. 303, 355 S.E.2d 573 (1987).
69. 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
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the right to counsel is not abridged merely because an attorney
experiences inconvenience in gaining access to his client.70
While recognizing in Dowell v. Commonwealth7' that simultane-
ous representation of two or more defendants is not a per se viola-
tion of the accused's right to effective assistance of counsel, the
Virginia Court of Appeals cited counsel's ethical obligation 71 to
avoid conflicting representation and to advise the court promptly
when a conflict of interest arises.
V. INDICTMENT
Both the Virginia Supreme Court73 and the court of appeals74
affirmed that the initiation of criminal charges, as well as their or-
der and timing, are matters of prosecutorial discretion. The court
of appeals also held in Reed v. Commonwealth75 that when a stat-
ute is cited in the indictment, the essential elements of the statute
are incorporated by reference.
In two other decisions, the court of appeals noted that although
the indictment must recite that the accused committed the offense
on or about a certain date,76 a charge is not invalid for omitting, or
stating imperfectly, the time at which the offense was committed
when time is not an essential component of the offense. 77
The Virginia Court of Appeals reaffirmed in Cantwell v. Com-
monwealth78 that the Virginia Code provision governing amend-
ment of indictments is to be construed liberally.79 In Clinebell v.
Commonwealth,"0 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that if the
indictment is inadequate, the decision to order a bill of particulars
rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. The Virginia
Supreme Court held in Tasker v. Commonwealths' that the deci-
sion turns upon whether the matter left out of the indictment
70. Id. at 332, 356 S.E.2d at 167.
71. 3 Va. App. 555, 559, 351 S.E.2d 915, 917 (1986).
72. Id. at 559, 351 S.E.2d at 917 (citing VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
5-105(B) (1986)).
73. Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
74. Davis v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 27, 353 S.E.2d 905 (1987).
75. 3 Va. App. 665, 353 S.E.2d 166 (1987).
76. Marlowe v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 619, 347 S.E.2d 167 (1986).
77. Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 362, 349 S.E.2d 676 (1986).
78. 2 Va. App. 606, 347 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
79. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-231 (Repl. Vol. 1983).
80. 3 Va. App. 362, 365, 349 S.E.2d 676, 678 (1986).
81. 206 Va. 1019, 121 S.E.2d 459 (1961).
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would subject the accused to the danger of being tried upon a
charge for which he has not been indicted.
The 1987 General Assembly amended the Virginia Code to re-
quire a circuit court to impanel a special grand jury if a regular
grand jury so recommends, but only upon a court finding that the
grand jury had probable cause to believe that a crime was commit-
ted.82 The 1987 General Assembly also authorized the use of condi-
tional pleas in felony cases. With the approval of the court and the
Commonwealth, a defendant may enter a conditional guilty plea
and reserve the right, on appeal, to a review of any adverse deter-
mination on a pretrial motion.83 If a defendant prevails on appeal,
he will be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
VI. PRETRIAL MOTIONS
A. Discovery Motions
In Farish v. Commonwealth,8 4 the Virginia Court of Appeals ex-
amined the scope of the subpoena duces tecum. The court con-
strued Rule 3A:12(b) to allow a party access to relevant documents
in the possession of a person not a party to the case. The request-
ing party must show substantial basis for claiming that the docu-
ment is material because the subpoena cannot be used as a "fishing
expedition.""5
A defendant's right to discover exculpatory evidence does not in-
clude the unsupervised authority to search through the prosecu-
tion's files. The United States Supreme Court, in Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie,8" held that the defendant's discovery rights could be fully
protected when child abuse files are submitted only to the trial
court for in camera review. The trial court must release only that
information deemed likely to change the outcome of the trial. In
Walker v. Commonwealth,s7 however, the Virginia Court of Ap-
peals held that "[t]he suppression or withholding by the prosecu-
tion of evidence favorable to the accused upon request violates due
process when the evidence is material either to guilt or to punish-
82. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-206 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
83. Id. § 19.2-254.
84. 2 Va. App. 627, 630, 346 S.E.2d 736, 738 (1986).
85. Id. at 630, 346 S.E.2d at 738 (construing VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:12(b)).
86. 107 S. Ct. 989 (1987).
87. 4 Va. App. 286, 356 S.E.2d 853 (1987).
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ment, irrespective of the good faith of the prosecution.""8 Addi-
tionally, the court of appeals noted that "knowing use of false tes-
timony to obtain a conviction violates due process regardless of
whether the prosecutor solicited the false testimony or merely al-
lowed it to go uncorrected when it appeared." 9
B. Speedy Trial Issues
In Clark v. Commonwealth,9" the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that the prosecution of conspiracy charges is barred when the
charges for the underlying substantive offense have been dismissed
for lack of a speedy trial. In Walker v. Commonwealth,91 the court
held that speedy trial considerations do not apply to the time of
sentencing.92 Rather, the defendant must prove he was so
prejudiced by the delay in sentencing that he was effectively de-
nied due process of law. In Cantwell v. Commonwealth,93 the court
advised trial judges that although the "complete record" may be
sufficient to establish the reasons for delay, "[ildeally, the court's
order should specify the reasons for continuances or failure to try
within the statutory time limit and state the positions of the par-
ties with regard to that order." 94
C. Double Jeopardy
In Hill v. Commonwealth,95 the Virginia Court of Appeals held
that for purposes of double jeopardy, common law robbery was not
the same offense as entry of a bank with a deadly weapon with
intent to commit larceny. In Jordan v. Commonwealth," the court
explained further that the gravamen of robbery is violence to the
person. Thus, for double jeopardy purposes, "the appropriate 'unit
of prosecution' is determined by the number of persons from
whose possession property is taken separately by force or intimida-
tion. '97 In yet a third case, the court distinguished double jeopardy
88. Id. at 300, 356 S.E.2d at 861 (citing Lowe v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 670, 679, 239
S.E.2d 112, 118, cert. denied, 435 U.S. 950 (1977)).
89. Id.
90. 4 Va. App. 3, 353 S.E.2d 790 (1987).
91. 4 Va. App. 286, 356 S.E.2d 853 (1987).
92. Id. at 297, 356 S.E.2d at 859.
93. 2 Va. App. 606, 347 S.E.2d 523 (1986).
94. Id. at 611, 347 S.E.2d at 526.
95. 2 Va. App. 683, 347 S.E.2d 913 (1986).
96. 2 Va. App. 590, 347 S.E.2d 152 (1986).
97. Id. at 596, 347 S.E.2d at 156.
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considerations from the doctrine of collateral estoppel and held
that the latter "does not prevent a party from relying upon or us-
ing the same evidence in a subsequent proceeding to prove a fact
other than that for which it was offered in a prior proceeding."' 8
The 1987 General Assembly repealed a unique double jeopardy
provision of a state statute. Before repeal, the statute barred pros-
ecution under a state statute if the defendant had already been
charged and prosecuted for the same crime under a federal statute.
Effective July 1, 1987, this proscription no longer exists.99
VII. TRIALS
The constitutional right to a fair trial requires that a judge not
express or indicate an opinion as to the credibility of a witness. 100
In Henshaw v. Commonwealth,10 1 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the prejudicial effect of a judge's comment on the credi-
bility of a witness could not be cured by a jury instruction that
only the jury can determine a witness' credibility. When an error
such as this occurs, a motion for a mistrial should be granted.102
In Cumbee v. Commonwealth, °" the court stated that the right
to a "public trial" means that attendance "is not limited or re-
stricted to any particular class of the community, but is open to
the free observation of all."104 In Vescuso v. Commonwealth,1 0 5 the
court of appeals held that the record did not establish that the
security concerns justified trying the accused in a penal facility
rather than in a public courtroom.106 In another case, the Fourth
Circuit held that plea and sentencing proceedings must normally
be open to the public and the press. 10
7
Finally, in the area of public trials, the 1987 General Assembly
authorized a two-year experimental program to broadcast judicial
98. Dorn v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 110, 115, 348 S.E.2d 412, 415 (1986) (citing Simon
v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 419, 258 S.E.2d 567, 572 (1979)).
99. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-294 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
100. Brown v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 101, 348 S.E.2d 408 (1986).
101. 3 Va. App. 213, 348 S.E.2d 853 (1986).
102. Id. at 219, 348 S.E.2d at 857.
103. 219 Va. 1132, 254 S.E.2d 112 (1979).
104. Id. at 1135, 254 S.E.2d at 115 (quoting Jones v. Peyton, 208 Va. 378, 158 S.E.2d 181
(1967)).
105. 4 Va. App. 32, 354 S.E.2d 68, opinion vacated, 355 S.E.2d 892 (Va. App. Apr. 20,
1987).
106. Id. at 39, 354 S.E.2d at 71-72.
107. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1986).
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proceedings in the supreme court, the court of appeals, and in des-
ignated circuit and general district courts." 8
VIII. JURY SELECTION
Several recent cases provide further guidance on challenging a
juror for cause. In Gray v. Commonwealth,'0 9 the Virginia Supreme
Court held that jurors are not automatically excluded because they
are associated with law enforcement personnel. 1 0 In Mullis v.
Commonwealth"' the Virginia Court of Appeals stated that the
trial court should remove a juror who would "give unqualified
credence to the testimony of a law enforcement officer .. .12
The court of appeals also held that although doubts as to the im-
partiality of a juror must be resolved in favor of the accused,"' a
tendency to give some weight to the fact that a witness is a police
officer does not disqualify a juror.1 4
In Witherspoon v. Illinois,"5 the defendant's constitutional right
to an impartial jury was abridged when the trial judge removed a
juror for cause who was not irrevocably opposed to the death pen-
alty." '6 Reaffirming the Witherspoon decision, the Court recently
held that a judge's decision to similarly remove a juror must be
reversed, and would not be sustained under the harmless error
doctrine on the basis that the prosecution retains a preemptory
challenge that might have been used. 1 7
IX. TRIALS AND SENTENCING OF DEFENDANTS IN ABSENTIA
In an important case of first impression, Head v. Common-
wealth,"L8 the Virginia Court of Appeals addressed the question of
trial in absentia for felony defendants." 9 The court held that
before proceeding with a trial in absentia, the trial judge should
108. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-266 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
109. 233 Va. 313, 356 S.E.2d 157 (1987).
110. Id. at 338, 356 S.E.2d at 171.
111. 3 Va. App. 564, 351 S.E.2d 919 (1987).
112. Id. at 571-72, 351 S.E.2d at 923.
113. See Educational Books, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 384, 349 S.E.2d 903
(1986).
114. Mullis, 3 Va. App. at 572, 351 S.E.2d at 924.
115. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
116. Id. at 522-23.
117. Gray v. Mississippi, 55 U.S.L.W. 4638 (U.S. May 18, 1987).
118. 3 Va. App. 163, 348 S.E.2d 423 (1986).
119. The Fourth Circuit had previously held that a defendant waived his constitutional
right to be present at trial when he knew of the trial date and voluntarily failed to appear.
United States v. Schocket, 753 F.2d 336 (4th Cir. 1985).
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consider: (1) "the likelihood that the trial could soon take place
with the defendant present"; (2) "the difficulty of rescheduling";
(3) "the burden on the Commonwealth in securing the attendance
of witnesses on another date"; and (4) "any other factors given to
explain the defendant's absence."'120 The court noted, however,
that none of the factors justified proceeding with the sentencing
stage in the defendant's absence. Thus, sentencing must be
delayed until the defendant is present.121
X. VIDEOTAPED DEPOSITIONS
After considering numerous proposals over past years, the 1987
General Assembly authorized the use of videotaped depositions in
certain child abuse cases. If a child under the age of eleven is the
alleged victim of kidnapping, criminal sexual assault or designated
family offenses, the child's deposition may be videotaped if the
Commonwealth and the accused consent, and the trial judge deter-
mines that the child will probably suffer severe emotional or
mental trauma if required to testify in open court.122
XI. COMPETENCY AND IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESSES
A number of recent cases have dealt with the competency and
impeachment of witnesses. In Mullis v. Commonwealth,'23 the
court of appeals upheld the lower court's ruling that a lay witness
is permitted to describe a person in "lay parlance" without using
medical terms. 24
Expert witnesses did not fare as well in the courts. In Patterson
v. Commonwealth,125 the court of appeals held that expert opinion
may not be based upon an out-of-court summation of testimony.1 26
In Clinebell v. Commonwealth, 27 the court held that the trial
120. Head, 3 Va. App. at 169-70, 348 S.E.2d at 427-28.
121. Id. at 172, 348 S.E.2d at 430; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-237 (Repl. Vol. 1983)
(prohibiting imposition of a jail sentence in a misdemeanor prosecution where the defendant
is absent).
122. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-67, 18.2-67.01 (Cune. Supp. 1987).
123. 3 Va. App. 564, 351 S.E.2d 919 (1987).
124. Id. at 573, 351 S.E.2d at 925.
125. 3 Va. App. 1, 348 S.E.2d 285 (1986).
126. Id. at 14, 348 S.E.2d at 292.
127. 3 Va. App. 362, 349 S.E.2d 676 (1986).
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court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow an optome-
trist treating the witness for hysterical amblyopia to offer an opin-
ion on the witness' tendency to fabricate testimony. '28
In Barrett v. Commonwealth,'29 the Virginia Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that it was within the trial court's discretion "to see
that the right of cross-examination is not abused once the right to
cross-examination has been fairly and substantially exercised.' 3 0
In Williams v. Commonwealth,'3' the Virginia Court of Appeals
upheld the trial court's discretion to prohibit counsel from recal-
ling witnesses for further cross-examination.'32 Finally, in Dela-
ware v. Van Arsdall,13 3 the United States Supreme Court applied
the harmless-error doctrine to an improper denial of a defendant's
opportunity to impeach a witness.3
In another major decision, Chrisman v. Commonwealth,"15 the
Virginia Court of Appeals held that since the crime of indecent
exposure does not involve deception, trickery, forgery, lying, cheat-
ing or stealing, it was not a crime of moral turpitude to be used for
impeachment purposes. 36
In Hall v. Commonwealth, 37 the Virginia Supreme Court stated
that, upon request, the trial judge must instruct the jury that in-
consistent statements are not evidence of the substantive issues,
but may be considered only on the collateral issue of the witness'
credibility. 38
In a case of first impression, Arnold v. Commonwealth,'39 the
court of appeals held that the trial judge has discretion to permit
the jury to use a typed transcript as a visual aid while listening to
a recording.
In Brown v. Commonwealth, 40 the Virginia Supreme Court held
that it is prejudicial error to introduce a co-conspirator's convic-
128. Id. at 369, 349 S.E.2d at 680.
129. 231 Va. 102, 341 S.E.2d 190 (1986).
130. Id. at 108, 341 S.E.2d at 194.
131. 4 Va. App. 53, 354 S.E.2d 79 (1987).
132. Id. at 78, 354 S.E.2d at 92-93.
133. 106 S. Ct. 1431 (1986).
134. Id. at 1438.
135. 3 Va. App. 89, 348 S.E.2d 399 (1986).
136. Id. at 100, 348 S.E.2d at 405.
137. 233 Va. 369, 355 S.E.2d 591 (1987).
138. Id. at 374, 355 S.E.2d at 595.
139. No. 0948-85 (Va. Ct. App. June 2, 1987).
140. 3 Va. App. 101, 348 S.E.2d 408 (1986).
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tion for the very offense for which the defendant is on trial."4' The
court recognized in another case that when the alleged victim de-
nied the act of incest, the results of a Human Leucocyte Antigen
(HLA) blood test were insufficient to prove incest beyond a reason-
able doubt.142
In Gardner v. Commonwealth, 43 the Virginia Court of Appeals
held that the trial court may reverse its granting of a mistrial and
reassemble the jury, provided the jury has not left the presence of
the court.144 In White v. Commonwealth, 45 the Virginia Court of
Appeals held that "a defendant is barred on appeal from challeng-
ing the sufficiency of the evidence when he fails to renew his mo-
tion to strike the evidence after presenting his case, unless the rec-
ord demonstrates that good cause exists' 46 or that justice
demands appellate consideration of the issue.
XII. SENTENCING
The due process clause, not the sixth amendment right to a
speedy trial, requires that a defendant be sentenced in a timely
fashion. 47 In Correll v. Commonwealth, 48 the Virginia Supreme
Court held that a post-sentence report is not required in a bench
trial where the judge considers the evidence adduced in the sen-
tencing hearing, as well as the pre-sentence report and, in a single
step, imposes the death sentence. 49
In Pruett v. Commonwealth,5" the supreme court held that ju-
rors may not be instructed that the court will impose a sentence if
the jurors are not unanimous in recommending the death
sentence.' 5'
The United States Supreme Court held this year that the jury
may not be precluded from considering any relevant mitigating ev-
141. Id. at 104, 348 S.E.2d at 409.
142. Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. 523, 351 S.E.2d 598 (1986).
143. 3 Va. App. 418, 350 S.E.2d 229 (1987).
144. Id. at 424, 350 S.E.2d at 232-33.
145. 3 Va. App. 231, 348 S.E.2d 866 (1986).
146. Id. at 234, 348 S.E.2d at 868.
147. Walker v. Commonwealth, No. 1133-85 slip op. at - (Va. Ct. App. June 2, 1987).
148. 232 Va. 454, 352 S.E.2d 352, cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3219 (1987).
149. Id. at 466, 352 S.E.2d at 359.
150. 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3220 (1987).
151. Id. at 279, 351 S.E.2d at 9.
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idence,' 5 ' but the jury may be instructed not to be swayed by mere
sympathy or sentiment.153
Closing the door to another broad attack on capital punishment,
the United States Supreme Court, in McCleskey v. Kemp, ' 5  re-
jected statistical studies indicating that black defendants convicted
of killing white victims were more likely to receive the death pen-
alty. The Court held that such studies do not establish racial dis-
crimination in violation of the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause. 55
XIII. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
In Howard v. Warden,'56 the Virginia Supreme Court held that a
habeas corpus motion will not be granted merely because counsel
allegedly committed errors in a prior habeas proceeding.1 5 The
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held in Whitley v. Blair'
that the doctrine of procedural default applies to claims raised by
a federal habeas corpus petitioner which he failed to raise in his
state habeas appeal.' 59
XIV. LEGISLATION: COMMONWEALTH'S RIGHT OF APPEAL
Effective January 1, 1988160 the Commonwealth has a limited
right of appeal to the Virginia Court of Appeals.' 6 ' The Common-
wealth may appeal from: (1) an order of a circuit court dismissing
a warrant, information or indictment, or any count or charge
thereof on the ground that a statute upon which it was based is
unconstitutional; or (2) an order of the circuit court prohibiting the
use of certain evidence at trial on the grounds that such evidence
was obtained in violation of the Fourth, Fifth or Sixth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution or article I, sections 8, 10
152. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 107 S. Ct. 1821 (1987).
153. California v. Brown, 107 S. Ct. 837 (1987).
154. 107 S. Ct. 1756 (1987).
155. Id. at 1770.
156. 232 Va. 16, 348 S.E.2d 211 (1986).
157. Id. at 19, 348 S.E.2d at 213.
158. 802 F.2d 1487 (4th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1618 (1987).
159. Id. at 1491.
160. Prior to January 1, 1988 the appellate procedures are governed by VA. CODE ANN.
§ 19.2-398 (Cum. Supp. 1987).
161. Id. § 19.2-398.
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or 11 of the Virginia Constitution.162 The Commonwealth may take
such an appeal only in felony cases and only before a jury is im-
paneled and sworn in a jury trial, or before the court begins to hear
or receive evidence or the first witness is sworn, whichever comes
first.163 In the case of an appeal of a suppression order, the Com-
monwealth must certify that the evidence is essential to the
prosecution.16 4
The Commonwealth must file a notice of appeal with the clerk of
the trial court, such notice being filed within seven days after entry
of the order from which the appeal is taken, and before a jury is
impaneled and sworn or in bench trials before the court begins to
hear evidence.165 Upon the filing of a timely notice of appeal, the
order from which the appeal is taken and further trial proceedings,
except for bail hearings, 6 6 shall be suspended pending disposition
of the appeal.1 67
The defendant has no independent right of appeal, but if the
Commonwealth appeals the defendant may cross appeal from any
pretrial orders from which the Commonwealth was entitled to ap-
peal. 6 8 An indigent defendant is entitled to court appointed coun-
sel to defend against the Commonwealth's appeal and to cross ap-
peal. 6 9 The defendant must file a notice of cross appeal with the
clerk of the circuit court within seven days following the notice of
appeal filed by the Commonwealth. 7"
The Commonwealth must file a petition for appeal with the
clerk of the court of appeals not more than fourteen days after the
transcript or written statement of facts is filed. Within fourteen
days after the Commonwealth files a petition for appeal, the de-
fendant may file a brief in opposition with the clerk of the court of
appeals. 7 12 If the defendant has filed a notice of cross appeal, he




165. Id. § 19.2-400.
166. Id. § 17.2-406.
167. Id.
168. Id. § 19.2-401.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. § 19.2-402. If there are objections to the transcript, the fourteen-day period runs
from the date the judge signs the transcript. See id. § 19.2-405.
172. Id.
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filed within the same time period as his brief in opposition.7 3 The
Commonwealth may file a brief in opposition to any petition for
cross appeal within ten days after the petition for cross appeal is
filed. 17 4 The court of appeals shall grant or deny petitions for ap-
peal and cross appeal within thirty days after the brief in opposi-
tion is filed. 17 5 No petition for rehearing may be filed. 176
If the petition for appeal is denied, the court of appeals shall
immediately return the record to the trial court.177 If the court of
appeals grants the petition for appeal, the Attorney General shall
represent the Commonwealth during the appeal.i7 The Common-
wealth shall file its opening brief within twenty-five days after the
date of the certificate awarding the appeal.179 The defendant's
brief must be filed within twenty-five days after the Common-
wealth's brief. The Commonwealth may then file a reply brief, in-
cluding its response to any cross appeal, within fifteen days after
the filing of the defendant's brief. With the permission of a judge
of the court of appeals, the time for filing any brief may be ex-
tended for good cause shown. 80 The Court of Appeals shall render
a decision within sixty days.' 8 ' No petition for rehearing may be
filed. The decision of the court of appeals is final,8 2 and no further
appeal shall be allowed to the Virginia Supreme Court.18 3
The statutory speedy trial provisions do not apply to the period
of time commencing when the Commonwealth's notice of appeal is




175. Id. § 19.2-403. If no brief in opposition is filed, the thirty days runs from the time







182. In its discretion, the supreme court may certify an appeal for expedited review by
the supreme court before it has been determined by the court of appeals. Id. § 19.2-407. The
grounds for such certification are set out in id. § 17-116.06 B.
183. Id. § 19.2-408. However, the subject of the pretrial appeal may be reconsidered on
direct appeal after the defendant's conviction.
184. Id. § 19.2-409.
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